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Consultation and Legitimacy in 
Transnational Standard-Setting 
Caroline Bradley* 
The recent financial crisis has generated agreement on the 
need for new transnational standards for financial regulation. 
When governments work together to develop transnational 
standards and rules they do so using processes which are not 
uniform, which often seem to develop in an ad hoc manner, and 
which do not necessarily reflect any particular conception of 
good government. Transnational standard-setters have 
responded to critiques of the legitimacy of their role by 
emphasizing consultation of stakeholders. This article will 
compare the uses of consultation in the development of policy 
at the national and supranational levels. It will examine the 
weaknesses in the construction of transnational consultations 
which undermine their value as mechanisms of legitimation. 
For example, transnational consultations lack visibility, they 
are usually carried out in a limited number of languages, or 
even only in English. More fundamentally, this article will 
critique the stakeholder focus of transnational consultations. In 
practice the identification of stakeholders who are potential 
respondents to consultations seems to imply that there may be 
others (non-stakeholders) whose views are less important. As 
the financial crisis has shown, it is not only those who consider 
themselves to be stakeholders in financial regulation who are 
affected by its failures.  
I. INTRODUCTION: TRANSNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
STANDARD-SETTING   
The global financial crisis demonstrated the transnational 
nature of financial market activity and persuaded governments 
to commit to an intensified co-ordination of financial market 
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regulation,1 including a review of existing harmonized 
standards,2 the introduction of new harmonized regulatory 
standards,3 and the development of new structures for 
addressing systemic risks.4 At the same time, the crisis meant 
that financial regulation (often treated as a technocratic 
sphere) came to be seen as a matter of significant domestic 
political interest.5 For example, politicians, regulators and 
private sector groups recognized that citizen-voters were 
offended by the fact that bankers, who were seen as having 
caused the crisis and whose institutions were bailed out by 
taxpayers, nevertheless had contractual rights to large bonuses 
while non-bankers suffered increased rates of mortgage 
foreclosure and unemployment.6 Market and regulatory 
 
 1. See, e.g., The Group of Twenty [G-20], Declaration on Strengthening 
the Financial System (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Document
s/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf; cf. Elliott Posner, 
Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation at the 
Turn of the Millennium, 63 INT’L ORG. 665, 669 (2009) (describing an 
institutionalization of transnational co-operation in financial regulation after 
2002).  
 2. See, e.g., Bank for Int’l Settlements [BIS], Basel Comm. on Banking 
Supervision, Consultative Document: Proposed Enhancements to the Basel II 
Framework, 1 (Jan. 2009) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs150.pdf 
(“The Basel Committee has finalised its proposals for enhancing the Basel II 
framework in the area of securitisation and more specifically for dealing with 
resecuritisations. These enhancements are intended to strengthen the 
framework and respond to lessons learned from the financial crisis.”). 
 3. See, e.g., id. at 2 (“[O]nce recovery is assured, prudential regulatory 
standards should be strengthened. Buffers above regulatory minima should be 
increased and the quality of capital should be enhanced. Guidelines for 
harmonisation of the definition of capital should be produced by end 2009. The 
BCBS should review minimum levels of capital and develop recommendations 
in 2010."). 
 4. G-20, supra note 1, at 1 (“We have agreed that the Financial Stability 
Forum should be expanded, given a broadened mandate to promote financial 
stability, and re-established with a stronger institutional basis and enhanced 
capacity as the Financial Stability Board (FSB).”). 
 5. In the aftermath of elections in the UK and the US during 2010, 
newly empowered politicians called for changes in financial regulation. See, 
e.g., HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: 
JUDGEMENT, FOCUS AND STABILITY, 2010, Cm. 7874, available at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/consult_financial_regulation_condoc.pdf; R. 
Christian Bruce, Congress: GOP-Controlled House of Representatives May 
Shape Rulewriting Under Dodd-Frank, 42 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2093 
(Nov. 4, 2010). 
 6. See, e.g., Productivity Commission, Executive Remuneration in 
Australia, Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No 49, (2009) [xv] (Austl.), 
available at http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/93590/executive-
remuneration-report.pdf (“A catalyst for this inquiry was concern that 
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failures in the financial markets7 were acknowledged to have 
imposed externalities on those outside the financial markets.8 
These developments led to debates about the extent to which 
the financial markets provide value to the real economy.9 
 
executive pay had got out of hand. This perception was fuelled by practices in 
financial institutions abroad that were seen as a key contributor to the global 
financial crisis (GFC). Further, while local shareholder value plummeted in 
2008 as a result of that imported crisis—with some companies and sectors 
being propped up by taxpayers—executive pay seemed to emerge unscathed, 
crystallising a view that executives were being rewarded for failure (after 
having been rewarded for success).”); Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
Reforming Remuneration Practices in Financial Services, CP 09/10 (2009), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_10.pdf; The Conference Board 
[TCB], The Conference Board Task Force on Executive Compensation (Sep. 
2009), available at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/ExecCompensatio
n2009.pdf. 
 7. See, e.g., FSA, The Turner Review: a Regulatory Response to the Global 
Banking Crisis, at 22 (Mar. 2009) [hereinafter The Turner Review], available 
at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf (identifying excessive 
reliance on particular risk management techniques as a factor contributing to 
the crisis: “Central to many of the techniques was the concept of Value-at-Risk 
(VAR), enabling inferences about forward-looking risk to be drawn from the 
observation of past patterns of price movement. This technique, developed in 
the early 1990s, was not only accepted as standard across the industry, but 
adopted by regulators as the basis for calculating trading risk and required 
capital, (being incorporated for instance within the European Capital 
Adequacy Directive).”). 
 8. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: 
SHADOW BANKING AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, 41 (May 4, 2010), available at 
http://c0182732.cdn1.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/2010-0505-Shadow-
Banking.pdf (“[M]any financial firms were crippled, and some only survived 
with substantial government assistance. Their capital was depleted and many 
of their revenue channels were extinguished or impaired by the decline in 
financial activity. This condition severely restricted their capacity to provide 
funding to consumers, businesses, and governments, reinforcing reductions in 
real economic activity around the world and magnifying the ensuing 
recession.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Adair Turner, Speech at CASS Business School: What Do 
Banks Do, What Should They Do and What Public Policies Are Needed to 
Ensure Best Results for the Real Economy? (Mar.17, 2010), 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/at_17mar10.pdf; cf. SOMO, EU Financial 
Reforms Newsletter (April 2010), http://somo.nl/dossiers-en/sectors/financial/eu
-financial-reforms/newsletter-finance/april_2010/view (“The financial sector 
has the potential to serve the real economy, to improve sustainability and to 
help people in need, for instance, through credit and investments. However, 
recent financial crises have shown that the financial industry primarily serves 
itself. The financial sector has become so powerful that some say we "live in 
financial times". It is therefore important to seize the momentum of the 
ongoing financial reforms to truly transform the financial sector so it serves 
the real economy, the environment and the interests of the most vulnerable 
within Europe and especially within developing countries.”).  
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Even before the crisis a number of transnational 
organizations developed standards for financial regulation:10 at 
the international level, the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO),11 the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (Basel Committee),12 and the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)13 
have all published harmonized principles of financial 
regulation. The European Union (EU) has promulgated 
harmonized rules of financial regulation which are binding on 
its members.14 Since the crisis, efforts to develop and 
implement transnational standards have intensified. 
Supranational standards and rules often require 
implementation within domestic legal systems in order to be 
effective. EU harmonization measures which are binding on the 
Member States are often15 structured as directives, which 
require Member State legislation for implementation, and 
standards developed by bodies such as the Basel Committee 
and IOSCO are not formally binding, leaving some discretion to 
states which implement them.16 The International Monetary 
 
 10. Note on terminology: this paper refers to the products of the Basel 
Committee and IOSCO as standards rather than rules because of their 
formally non-binding character. However, IOSCO and the Basel Committee 
often refer to what they produce as principles, rather than as standards. Their 
principles are principles which should be reflected in domestic regulatory 
schemes, rather than standards to be met by the suppliers of financial 
services, which would be more analogous to the products of other standards 
processes.  
 11. For a discussion of IOSCO’s Principles of Securities Regulation see, for 
example, K. Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing 
Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 116–120 (2002).  
 12. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS 
REGULATION 104 (2000) (describing how central bank governors established 
what is now the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in response to the 
failures of the Herstaat Bank and Franklin National Bank in 1974). 
 13. See, e.g., Pistor, supra note 11 at 120–21.  
 14. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Consumers of Financial Services and 
Multi-level Regulation in the European Union, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L J. 701 
(2008). 
 15. Although not always. See, e.g., Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on Credit 
Rating Agencies, O.J. No. L 302/1 (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:302:0001:0031:EN:P
DF.  
 16. See, e.g., D.E. Alford, Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision: an Enforceable International Financial Standard?, 28 B. C. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 237, 286 (2005) (“[B]ecause the agreements are not legally 
enforceable, nations can vary in their own interpretation and implementation 
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Fund (IMF) and the World Bank monitor implementation of 
standards by their members.17 Weaker states will tend to have 
less discretion in implementation than more powerful states, 
but even more powerful states notice the results of reviews by 
the international financial institutions.18 Since the financial 
crisis the Financial Stability Board has begun a system of peer 
review to supplement the FSAP and ROSC programs.19  
Where discretion in implementation of transnational 
standards is limited, formally as is often the case in the EU,20 
 
of the standards.”).  
 17. The IMF and World Bank do so through Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) and the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP). See, e.g., The World Bank, Reports on the Observance of Standards 
and Codes (ROSC): Overview of the ROSC Accounting and Auditing Program 
(Jan. 2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa_overview.pdf, 
IMF, Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook (Sept. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fsa/eng/index.htm. 
 18. See, e.g., IMF, Financial Sector Assessment Program, United States of 
America: The IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation—
Detailed Assessment of Implementation, at 26, IMF Country Report No. 10/125 
(May 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10125.
pdf (“The overall ratings in the Report, however, do not reflect the CFTC’s and 
SEC’s regulatory successes and, in some cases, suggest a misunderstanding of 
the U.S. regulatory system. Thus, the Commissions strongly disagree with 
many of the ratings in the Report. By way of example, while the IOSCO 
Principles recognize that regulators may use different approaches to 
accomplish the same objectives, the Report’s rating on market intermediaries 
is based on the assumption that every intermediary must be regulated the 
same way. That is, they must undergo an extensive review prior to 
registration. This requirement, however, cannot be found in the Principles or 
the assessment Methodology. The Report rejects a legitimate risk-based 
approach to a registration requirement and oversight of futures and securities 
intermediaries without evidence that the approach is ineffective. The Report 
also states that capital requirements for futures and securities firms do not 
fully address risk, yet provides no evidence that the CFTC’s and SEC’s current 
requirements do not already exceed recognized international best practice as 
reflected in the Principles.”). 
 19. See Financial Stability Board (FSB), Country Review of Mexico: Peer 
Review Report, at 3 (Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://www.financialstability
board.org/publications/r_100927.pdf (“FSB country peer reviews are intended 
to complement and support the IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) by providing an opportunity for members to engage in 
dialogue with their FSB peers and share experiences on progress made in 
addressing relevant FSAP recommendations—notably those covering or 
requiring improvements in regulation, supervision and institutional and 
market infrastructure.”); FSB, Thematic Review on Compensation: Peer 
Review Report (Mar. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100330a.pdf.  
 20. A number of the EU’s single market measures are maximum 
standards measures. See, e.g., Directive 2003/71/EC, of the European 
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or because of the need to pacify international financial 
institutions (IFIs) or perhaps because of public commitments 
such as those made in the G20’s crisis-related declarations,21 
the processes whereby the transnational standards are agreed 
upon become more significant.22  
Before the crisis, and in response to critiques of the 
transparency and inclusiveness of transnational standard-
setting,23 supranational standard-setters began to formalize 
their procedures, developing practices for consulting on 
proposed standards, and even establishing consultation 
policies.24 The transnational standard-setters are transplanting 
a technique which is often used in the domestic context, 
particularly in the domestic regulatory context, to their own 
transnational sphere. But there are significant differences 
between this transnational context and the domestic context. 
Some commentators have argued that the multi-level features 
of transnational standard-setting may in fact enhance 
 
Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the Prospectus to be 
Published When Securities are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading 
and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, O.J. No. L 345/64 (Dec. 31, 2003). 
 21. See also IMF, The G-20 Mutual Assessment Process and the Role of the 
Fund (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/1
20209a.pdf; FSB, FSB Framework for Strengthening Adherence to 
International Standards (Jan. 9, 2010), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100109a.pdf. 
 22. In this paper I do not seek to argue that there is one optimal 
procedure for the development of transnational standards, but to critique 
current consultation processes as a component of such procedures. The 
literature on global administrative law tends to assume that a global 
administrative law should be based on Western principles. See, e.g., Carol 
Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 187, 207 (2006) (“Administrative law is largely a Western 
construct, taking its shape during the late 19th century as an instrument for 
the control of public power.”). Harlow questions this assumption. See, e.g., id. 
at 213–4, (arguing “for pluralism: for diversity as the overarching value and 
for subsidiarity as the fundamental principle of global administrative law. 
Otherwise, the likely contribution of global administrative law will be to stifle 
what is democratic and legitimate what is not.”).  
 23. For a critique of the global legal harmonization phenomenon 
generally, see, for example, IUC Global Legal Standards Research Group, IUC 
Independent Policy Report: At the End of the End of History - Global Legal 
Standards: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?, 9:3 GLOBAL JURIST 
(2009). 
 24. See, e.g., IOSCO, Executive Committee, IOSCO Consultation Policy 
and Procedure (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/p
df/IOSCOPD197.pdf; cf. Harlow, supra note 22, at 199–200 (“The link between 
the pursuit of global administrative law and the agenda of cosmopolitan 
democracy for a ‘new world order’ lies in the concept of participation.”). 
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accountability25 and legitimacy.26 Others are more skeptical.27 
This paper focuses on consultation as a component of policy-
making, and, in particular on the different motivations and 
structuring of consultations domestically and in the 
transnational context to argue that it is not a simple matter to 
transplant techniques from one context to another.  
At the transnational level, different organizations 
approach consultation and the reporting of the results of 
consultation differently.28 Moreover, although transnational 
standard-setters have improved the transparency and openness 
of their processes, their role and activities are fundamentally 
different from those of many domestic legislators and 
regulators. Transnational standard-setters engage in 
consultation as a concession rather than as a matter of 
obligation: they are not required by any binding rules to carry 
 
 25. Accountability is a term which is used in different ways. For an 
argument that we should distinguish between accountability as a virtue and 
accountability as a mechanism, see Mark Bovens, Two Concepts of 
Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a Mechanism, 33 W. EUR. 
POL. 946 (2010). 
 26. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative 
Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 17 (2006) (“While far from 
ideal, the Basel process has come a long way from the purely closed ‘club’ 
model of its origins, and demonstrates the possibility for enhanced 
accountability and legitimacy in international regulation. At the international 
level, the Basel committee has recently engaged in a relatively open process 
akin to a notice and comment rule-making in developing international capital 
standards, and has improved its transparency. At the domestic level, central 
banks and national bank regulators have enmeshed the Basel standards in the 
domestic notice and comment rule-making process, enhancing the legitimacy 
of the international process through local procedural protections. Moreover, 
international regulatory processes, including Basel, can in some instances 
help to reinforce, rather than undermine, domestic norms of accountability 
and legitimacy, particularly in countries where inside elites block reforms and 
prevent transparent domestic regulatory processes from occurring.”). 
 27. See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, Co-Option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global 
Administrative Law, 37 INT’L L. & POL. 799, 800 (2008) (“By focusing 
exclusively on GAL, a false impression may arise that existing international 
institutions are becoming more participatory and responsive to the concerns of 
developing countries and their peoples.”); see also id. at 806 (“[E]merging GAL 
is an integral part of international law and institutions that have an imperial 
character. As in the case of a non-democratic nation-state, non-democratic 
international laws and institutions—that is, the imperial nascent global 
state—cannot tolerate a robust application of principles of administrative law. 
GAL is today being shaped by a transnational capitalist class that seeks to 
legitimize unequal laws and institutions and deploy it to its advantage.”). 
 28. See generally Caroline Bradley, Private International Law-Making for 
the Financial Markets, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 127, 140–154 (2005). 
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out consultations at all or in any particular way. As a corollary 
of this lack of obligation, stakeholders do not have meaningful 
rights to be consulted. Even the EU is concerned to ensure that 
its interests are taken into account in the transnational 
standard-setting process.29  
There are still few possibilities for challenging 
transnational standards,30 and no harmonized supranational 
administrative law.31 Governmental agencies are subject to 
court challenges to their domestic rule-making activities,32 and 
to formal review by legislatures and other governmental 
agencies.33 Transnational standard-setters are not subject to 
 
 29. See, e.g., Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a Community Programme to Support Specific Activities in the 
Field of Financial Services, Financial Reporting and Auditing, O J No. L 253/8 
(Sep. 25, 2009), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.d
o?uri=OJ:L:2009:253:0008:0016:EN:PDF. Recital number 3 states: “In a global 
economy, there is also a need to converge standards between jurisdictions and 
develop international standards under a transparent and democratically 
accountable process. It is therefore important that the Community play a role 
in the international standard-setting process for financial markets. To ensure 
that the interests of the Community are respected and that global standards 
are of high quality and compatible with Community law, it is essential that 
the interests of the Community are adequately represented in that 
international standard-setting process.” Id. 
 30. However, the EU courts have stated that EU and Member State 
authorities which implement Security Council resolutions must ensure that 
EU fundamental rights are respected. See Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-
415.05, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council of the 
European Union and Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 2008 E.C.R. I-06351 at 
para. 314.); Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm’n, 2010 E.U.E.C.J., available at 
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2010/T8509.html.  
 31. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 15, 16 (2005) (noting “an 
accountability deficit in the growing exercise of transnational regulatory 
power.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006); 
cf. HM Government, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, 10 (U.K. 
May 2010), http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/409088/pfg_coalition.pdf 
(“We will give the public the opportunity to challenge the worst regulations.”). 
Court review of administrative agency rule-making is not unproblematic, 
however. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Law and Engineering: In Search of the 
Law-Science Problem, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 143–35 (critiquing the 
courts’ reviews of rule-making and recalls by the NHTSA). 
 33. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-8 OCC 
PREEMPTION RULEMAKING: OPPORTUNITIES EXISTED TO ENHANCE THE 
CONSULTATIVE EFFORTS AND BETTER DOCUMENT THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, 
5 (Oct. 17, 2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d068.pdf (“OCC does not have 
written guidance, policies, or procedures detailing the rulemaking process. 
Instead, OCC uses a ‘rulemaking checklist’ that serves as a guide for 
completing the required reviews and the routing of documents. According to 
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the same type of formal monitoring,34 and their work is 
insulated from the sort of scrutiny (however imperfect) the 
media apply to domestic governmental and legislative bodies. 
To the extent that the transnational standards pre-empt 
domestic policy choices these facts matter. 
II. CONSULTATION AS AN ASPECT OF DOMESTIC 
GOVERNANCE 
Domestic conceptions of good government and of how 
governments should relate to their citizens vary.35 
Governments frequently inform36 and consult with their 
citizens during the policy-making process,37 but such 
consultation is carried out in various ways,38 performs a 
 
internal control standards for the federal government, agencies should follow 
written procedures in making important decisions. Without such 
documentation, it may not be clear—to agency management, auditors, or 
oversight committees—that an agency followed applicable requirements.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Chinmi, supra note 27, at 810 (“The Indian experience shows 
that the role of social movements may prove particularly critical at the global 
level, given the fact that judicial intervention is often not a possibility.”); cf. 
Harlow, supra note 22, at 212 (“[I]n global space, power is diffused to networks 
of private and public actors, escaping the painfully established controls of 
democratic government and public law.”). 
 35. Cf. HOUSE OF COMMONS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SELECT 
COMMITTEE, GOOD GOVERNMENT, EIGHTH REPORT OF SESSION 2008–09, H.C. 
97-1, ¶ 1 (U.K. June 18, 2009) (“Good government is the professed aim of all 
governments. But while everyone can agree that it is a desirable thing, it is 
much harder to define what good government actually is and how to achieve 
it.”). 
 36. The World Bank encourages communication with citizens as an aspect 
of good governance. See, e.g., Helen Darbishire, Proactive Transparency: the 
Future of the Right to Information?, (World Bank Institute, Governance 
Working Paper Series, 2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVACC
/Resources/DarbishireProactiveTransparency.pdf. 
 37. Courts may treat the fact of consultation as significant. See, e.g., 
Lehman Bros. Int. (Europe) (In Administration) v. CRC Credit Fund Ltd. & 
Ors., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 917 [58], [2010] WLR (D) 227, [58] (Eng.) (“The rules 
should also in my judgment be taken to be grounded in reality. FSMA requires 
the rules to be the subject of detailed and far-reaching consultation in the 
market prior to adoption (section 155). It is thus improbable that the FSA was 
oblivious to the fact that mistakes or worse are made by firms in practice, and 
that serious mistakes have been made in the past. It can be assumed that the 
FSA as regulator would seek to ensure that the rules ensured investment 
protection even where mistakes were made.”). 
 38. See, e.g., HM GOVERNMENT, CODE OF PRACTICE ON CONSULTATION, 5 
(U.K. July 2008), http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file47158.pdf (“At times, a formal, 
written, public consultation will not be the most effective or proportionate way 
of seeking input from interested parties, e.g. when engaging with stakeholders 
very early in policy development (preceding formal consultation) or when the 
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number of different functions, and often has mixed motives. 
Moreover, the differences in relationships between the 
executive and legislative branches of government in different 
jurisdictions influence who carries out consultations and how 
they are constructed. 
The UK’s Prime Minister, who is the Head of Government, 
is generally the leader of the political party which has a 
majority in Parliament. Through the Whip system, the 
government can usually ensure the passage of legislation it 
proposes. In contrast, in the US, the election of a President has 
no necessary connection with majorities in Congress, and 
political parties have much less power over elected 
representatives. In both countries the legislature engages in 
fact finding about issues and policy and about proposed 
legislation through hearings. And in both countries interest 
groups seek to influence legislation. But in the UK the 
government has a much tighter control of the development of 
broad outlines of policy than does the executive branch in the 
US, and UK government departments regularly issue 
consultation documents as a component of the policy 
development process.39 At the same time, the UK’s ability to 
make independent decisions about the development of policy is 
limited by the UK’s membership of the European Union, so 
although the UK government carries out some consultations 
relating to its own legislative proposals, in other cases it 
consults with respect to the implementation within the UK of 
proposals developed in the EU.40 The UK and the US also differ 
 
scope of an exercise is very narrow and the level of interest highly specialised. 
In such cases an exercise under this Code would not be appropriate. There is, 
moreover, a variety of other ways available to seek input from interested 
parties other than formal consultation.”). 
 39. But cf., e.g., HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL, H.L. Paper 69, ¶ 19 (U.K. 
Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldc
onst/69/69.pdf (“The speed with which the policy was introduced, with no 
significant consultation, no green paper and no detailed assessment of the pros 
and cons of a five year term over a four year term, suggests that short-term 
considerations were the drivers behind the Bill’s introduction. The Hansard 
Society argued that ‘political expediency appears to have taken priority over 
Parliament’s right to properly scrutinise the executive.’ Democratic Audit 
stressed that ‘this change is yet another piecemeal alteration, implemented 
with insufficient consultation, to the UK constitution’.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 40. See, e.g., HM TREASURY, LAYING OF REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE 
NEW E-MONEY DIRECTIVE: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (U.K. Oct. 2010), 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/emoney_directive_consultation.pdf. 
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in the organization of their administrative or regulatory 
agencies.  
But, despite these structural differences in government, 
different states do collect information and consult with citizens 
as a component of policy-making. The global financial crisis has 
led to a huge transnational fact-finding exercise, carried out by 
staff at the international financial institutions41 and by states. 
The US established a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,42 
and the Government Accountability Office published a number 
of reports on financial regulation.43 The UK established an 
Independent Commission on Banking which has stated that it 
wants “to stimulate a wide debate” on reforms to the banking 
sector.44 The EU Commission has emphasized that in 
developing its new rules for financial regulation, “[a]ccording to 
better regulation principles, the proposals are being prepared 
after stakeholder consultation and impact assessments.”45  
Recent trends in the UK46 and the US47 have emphasized 
the idea of drawing citizens into the policy-making process 
 
 41. See, e.g., 98 OECD JOURNAL: FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS, no. 1, 2010, 
passim.; INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: 
SOVEREIGNS, FUNDING, AND SYSTEMIC LIQUIDITY (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/02/pdf/text.pdf. 
 42. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was established by the 
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-21, § 5, 123 Stat. 
1617, 1625 (May 20, 2009). The Comission’s website is at http://www.fcic.gov/. 
 43. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, 
FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING 
PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
SYSTEM (Jan. 2009); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-739, 
FINANCIAL CRISIS HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF LEVERAGE AT 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACROSS SYSTEM (July 2009). 
 44. Press Release, Independent Commission on Banking, Independent 
Commission on Banking: Public Events, para. 1 (Nov. 4, 2010), available at 
http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk/bankingcommission/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/ICB-Press-Release-6.pdf. 
 45. Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth, at 2, COM 
(2010) 301 final (June 2, 2010). 
 46. See, e.g., Caroline Spelman, Foreword, in AN INVITATION TO SHAPE 
THE NATURE OF ENGLAND: DISCUSSION DOCUMENT, 2 (Defra ed., U.K. July 
2010), http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/natural/documents/newp-discussi
on-260710.pdf (“This document is a big, open invitation to all, to help shape 
the future of our natural environment, and in so doing, help shape a brighter 
future for our economic prosperity and quality of life. I welcome all views and 
ideas, and very much hope you will participate.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Memorandum of January 21, 2009, Transparency and Open 
Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“Government should be 
participatory. Public engagement enhances the Government’s effectiveness 
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more effectively, and at an early stage in the process. And the 
EU clearly envisages citizen involvement in policy development 
as a way of improving public acceptance and approval of the 
EU and its institutions. But although consultation seems to 
reflect a governmental commitment to transparency as well as 
to engagement with citizens,48 consultation documents typically 
frame questions and invite responses to those questions, thus 
attempting to influence how consultees engage with 
government. For example, Defra, which has issued “a big open 
invitation to all” to participate in the discussion about shaping 
the nature of England,49 and which encourages grass roots 
organizations to engage people they work with in the 
discussion,50 has published documents which are designed to 
guide the grass roots organizations: A Guide for Facilitators,51 
and a Briefing Note for Participants.52 
 
and improves the quality of its decisions. Knowledge is widely dispersed in 
society, and public officials benefit from having access to that dispersed 
knowledge. Executive departments and agencies should offer Americans 
increased opportunities to participate in policymaking and to provide their 
Government with the benefits of their collective expertise and information. 
Executive departments and agencies should also solicit public input on how we 
can increase and improve opportunities for public participation in 
Government.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, The Transparency President? The Obama 
Administration and Open Government, 22 GOVERNANCE 529, 535 (2009) 
(“[T]ransparency can affirmatively improve governmental decision making by 
helping inform the public about the problems governmental officials seek to 
solve and the options they are considering. By making more information 
available, the public can then participate more thoughtfully in the 
governmental process . . . .”). 
 49. See, e.g., Spelman, supra note 46. 
 50. See AN INVITATION TO SHAPE THE NATURE OF ENGLAND, 
http://ww2.defra.gov.uk/environment/natural/whitepaper/ (last visited Feb. 11, 
2010) (“We want all interested parties to have a say in shaping the 
development of the White Paper. To do this we encourage national 
organisations who already have a relationship with local groups, societies, 
consumers or individuals, to engage them. For example, NGOs who have local 
groups or large memberships, civil society organisations who are in touch with 
local civic groups, and any businesses who wish to engage their consumers on 
White Paper issues.”). 
 51. DEFRA, AN INVITATION TO SHAPE THE NATURE OF ENGLAND: GUIDE 
FOR FACILITATORS, 1 (U.K. 2010), http://ww2.defra.gov.uk/files/def-newp-facil-
guide.pdf (identifying “[t]he questions we would like addressed”). A feedback 
form is available at http://ww2.defra.gov.uk/files/def-r13142-newp-form.doc 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2011). 
 52. DEFRA, AN INVITATION TO SHAPE THE NATURE OF ENGLAND: BRIEFING 
NOTE FOR PARTICIPANTS (U.K. 2010), http://ww2.defra.gov.uk/files/def-newp-
brief-note.pdf. 
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In recent years, many proposals to reform the policy 
process have focused on trying to ensure that policy is evidence-
based,53 and that it is considered carefully in the early stages.54 
Consultation processes may be a component of evidence-based 
policy-making.55 They may be designed to collect information,56 
either factual information about the context for which policy is 
 
 53. See, e.g., Matthew Cashmore et al., Evaluating the Effectiveness of 
Impact Assessment Instruments: Theorising the Nature and Implications of 
Their Political Constitution, 30 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 371, 371 
(2010) (“The principle underlying the evidence-based policy agenda is that 
interventions should be based on ‘what works’ (i.e. empirical evidence of 
effectiveness), rather than political belief . . . .”). There is a vast literature on 
the relationship between law and science, which addresses the complexities of 
the idea of evidence as a foundation for policy. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 
32. 
 54. See, e.g., GOOD GOVERNMENT, supra note 35, ¶ 57 (“The Better 
Government Initiative (BGI), comprising several former senior civil servants 
and government advisers, drew on their extensive experience of policy making 
to suggest a range of measures which would contribute to improved 
government. One key recommendation was for policy proposals to be as 
comprehensive and well-thought through as possible. According to the BGI, 
the policy making process should allow for effective and informed policy 
deliberation, including through the publication of serious, ‘unspun’ white 
papers and the provision of draft bills as a matter of course.”). 
 55. And some respondents to consultations urge that policy-making be 
evidence-based. See, e.g., Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, Comments on The 
Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis, 8 (June 
18, 2009), http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/ISDA-Response-to-Turner-Review-
and-DP092.pdf (“We have no objection, of course, to product regulation being 
considered, but believe that it is vital to do three things in conducting any 
such exercise: 1. Recognise the level of de facto product regulation that already 
exists 2. identify a clear, proportionate and evidence-based rationale for any 
additional regulation, 3. work with the grain of existing industry initiatives, 
notably (at the time of writing) those relating to regulatory transparency.”). 
 56. Governments adopt other strategies for developing policy, including 
Commissions and Committees which are tasked with reviewing or developing 
the law to achieve particular objectives. See, e.g., Australian Financial Centre 
Forum, Australia as a Financial Centre: Building on our Strengths, (Nov. 
2009) 5, http://www.treasury.gov.au/afcf/content/reference_papers/downloads/
AFCF_Building_on_Our_Strengths_Report.pdf (“On 26 September 2008, the 
then Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer 
Affairs, the Hon Chris Bowen MP, announced the establishment of the 
Australian Financial Centre Forum, designed to position Australia as a 
leading financial services centre. The Minister stated that the focus of the 
initiative was on ensuring that Australia’s policy settings allowed the financial 
sector to take full advantage of business opportunities in the region . . . . The 
Minister announced the appointment of Mr Mark Johnson, retired Deputy 
Chairman of Macquarie Bank, to lead the work of the Forum, along with the 
establishment of a small group of senior financial sector executives to form a 
Panel of Experts . . . . The Forum was further supported by the establishment 
of a Reference Group of representative industry bodies.”). 
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to be developed, or specific technical feedback on the details or 
drafting of proposed changes. Here it must be noted that 
although evidence-based policy-making is meant to be neutral 
from a political perspective, the evaluation of evidence is 
complex,57 and data is often manipulated to further ends which 
are inherently political.58 Trade associations, think tanks, other 
interest groups, and government agencies all seek to influence 
the policy development process, and consultation provides fora 
in which they can do so.59 
Trade associations are often responsible for a substantial 
proportion of contributions to consultations.60 Governments 
may adopt procedures to try to ensure that the data on which 
they rely in policy-making are sound.61 
 
 57. See, e.g., Cashmore et al., supra note 53, at 372 (“Evaluating 
effectiveness is conceptually and methodologically problematic, and it is 
arguably the case that rejuvenation of interest in, and growth in demand for, 
evaluation has yet to result in significant advances being made in relation to 
these issues.”). 
 58. Cf. D. T. Hornstein, Accounting for Science: The Independence of 
Public Research in the New, Subterranean Administrative Law, 66 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2003, at 227, 228 (“[T]his Article identifies within 
OMB's programs the expanded boundaries of a new, subterranean 
battleground in administrative law, one in which the scent of future regulation 
is caught by stakeholders who then battle to shape the scientific facts on 
which future regulation may be based.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Anthony M. Bertelli & Jeffrey B. Wenger, Demanding 
Information: Think Tanks and the US Congress, 39 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 225, 225 
(2009) (“We advance the theoretical claim that the nature of debate in 
legislative committees drives a demand for strategic information, and the 
benefactors of think tanks, seeing a market opportunity, create and maintain 
the organizations which supply that information.”). 
 60. See, e.g., FSA, Short selling: Feedback on DP09/1, ¶ 1.7 (U.K. Oct. 
2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/fs09_04.pdf (“There were 54 
responses to DP9/01, including 17 from trade associations (or trade association 
coalitions) representing the views of their members. Most of the other 
responses came from authorised firms, but there were several responses both 
from non-authorised firms and individuals. We thank respondents for their 
comments.”). 
 61. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
COMMITTEE, THE GOVERNMENT’S REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES APPLYING TO 
THE TREATMENT OF INDEPENDENT SCIENTIFIC ADVICE PROVIDED TO 
GOVERNMENT, H.C. 158-1 (U.K. Dec. 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/158/15
8i.pdf. Cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-773T, SCIENTIFIC 
INTEGRITY: EPA'S EFFORTS TO ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY AND 
TRANSPARENCY OF ITS SCIENTIFIC PROCESSES (June 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09773t.pdf. 
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Public consultation by governments is, in any case, about 
more than gathering policy-relevant data. In many technical 
areas citizens may not have the necessary skills and knowledge 
to evaluate properly the evidence cited as the basis for policy 
proposals.62 Governments want to know not just what facts 
citizens have which are relevant to policy-making, but also 
what their opinions are. Governments may choose to revise63 or 
to abandon policies which would be unpopular, even if they 
might be effective. Often, consultations combine data-gathering 
and opinion forming functions. Pre-legislative consultations 
carried out by the executive allow governments to communicate 
with voters about their proposals to change the law in order to 
maintain confidence that they are addressing perceived 
problems or keeping campaign commitments. In a sense, 
therefore, some, particularly pre-legislative, consultations are 
designed to improve a government’s relations with its public.64 
Consultations may even be designed to manipulate public 
opinions about proposed legislation. 
 
 62. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Transparency in Public Science: Purposes, 
Reasons, Limits, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2006, at 21, 24 
(“[M]odern societies' increasing dependence on science has proceeded hand in 
hand with developments that disable most citizens, even the most technically 
expert, from effectively addressing the larger set of questions: Is it good 
science; what is it good for; and is it good enough? Science has not only become 
infused with multiple social and political interests; it is also in danger of 
escaping effective critical control. Too often scientific knowledge seems to be 
‘sequestered,’ concealed from those who could benefit from it or who could 
comment meaningfully on its quality and relevance.”). 
 63. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS REGULATORY REFORM COMMITTEE, 
DRAFT LEGISLATIVE REFORM (REVOCATION OF PRESCRIBED FORM OF PENALTY 
NOTICE FOR DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR) ORDER 2009, H.C. 1108, ¶ 12 (U.K. Nov. 
18, 2009), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cm
select/cmdereg/1108/1108.pdf (“The rationale of the response is essentially 
that the Department did not want to delay, but was unable to lay the draft 
Order immediately after consultation because consultation had shown the 
proposal to be more controversial than expected. That rather misses the point 
that a principal purpose of consultation is to establish whether there are views 
on a policy that might cause it to be reconsidered.”). 
 64. See, e.g., BIS, The Insolvency Service, Encouraging Company Rescue – 
a consultation, ¶ 2 (June 15, 2009) [hereinafter Rescue Consultation], 
available at http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/c
on_doc_register/ (“The UK has a long established and well developed 
insolvency legislative framework, which is highly regarded worldwide, with a 
reputation for fairness and for striking the right balance between the interests 
of debtors and creditors. We want to ensure that the insolvency regime 
remains world class and fit for purpose and this consultation is part of that 
ongoing process.”). 
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These two main functions of consultations (relationship 
oriented and fact oriented) operate together in the context of 
domestic politics, and sometimes may blur together. A concern 
for facts and evidence to support policy may lead governments 
to over-emphasize the comments of those who appear to have 
expertise when they weigh responses to consultations. For 
example, reports have raised questions about whether 
governmental authorities were too willing to accept financial 
institutions’ claims about their ability to assess and manage 
the risks associated with their operations in developing rules of 
financial regulation.65  
At the domestic level, consultations may be structured 
differently at different stages in the policy-development 
process. Consultation exercises may be presented as 
preliminary, for example being denominated as discussions 
rather than consultations.66 Governments may set up groups of 
experts to provide advice in particular policy areas.67 Data 
gathering consultations may be carried out by congressional or 
parliamentary committees at an early stage before the 
consideration of proposed legislation,68 or in the context of 
specific legislative proposals. When governments publish 
documents setting out their proposals for new legislation they 
may seek data from the public about the likely impact of the 
proposals.69 Government-generated impact assessments and 
 
 65. See, e.g., The Turner Review, supra note 7. 
 66. See, e.g., HM TREASURY, DISCUSSION PAPER ON DEVELOPING NON-
BANK LENDING CHANNELS FOR UK BUSINESSES (Jan. 12, 2010), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/non_bank_lending_discussionpaper.pdf. 
 67. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t for Bus., Innovation & Skills Press 
Release, Business Secretary Vince Cable today announced the creation of a 
new group of experts to advise him on business and economic policy (May 18, 
2010) (on file with author), available at http://nds.coi.gov.uk/content/Detail.asp
x?ReleaseID=413396&NewsAreaID=2. 
 68. See, e.g., HOUSE OF LORDS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SELECT 
COMMITTEE, CALL FOR EVIDENCE: BEHAVIOUR CHANGE (July 29, 2010), 
available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/science-
technology/behaviourchange/CfEBehaviourChange.pdf. 
 69. See, e.g., Rescue Consultation, supra note 64, at 8 (“A1. Do you agree 
that it would be helpful for medium and large-sized companies to be allowed to 
benefit from the option of a moratorium from creditor action for up to 28 days? 
A2. How useful do you think this would be? Do you think it would encourage 
medium and large-sized companies to utilise the CVA procedure? (If you can 
give figures, or comment on those in the initial Impact Assessment, that would 
be helpful.)”). 
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cost-benefit analyses70 may also be communicated to the public 
in the course of consultations. In times of emergency 
governments may limit their consultations in the interests of 
speedy rule-making.71 
Pre-legislative consultations may raise broad issues of 
principle for discussion. However, pre-legislative consultations 
on measures to implement supranational rules or standards 
are less likely to raise such broad issues. Although 
governmental authorities do sometimes carry out domestic 
consultations while they are negotiating transnational 
standards,72 this is not inevitable. So, at the time of 
implementation the Government carrying out the consultation 
may have already committed itself to the fact of 
implementation, although it may have retained some discretion 
with respect to the modalities of implementation. 
Implementation consultations will therefore reflect any limits 
on discretion with respect to implementation that are inherent 
in the supranational rules or standards. As noted above, 
governments may have limited discretion in implementation 
either as a legal matter, because the rules by their terms limit 
discretion, or as a practical matter because of political rather 
 
 70. See, e.g., UK GOV’T’S IMPACT ASSESSMENT LIBRARY, 
http://www.ialibrary.berr.gov.uk/; see also, e.g., European Ct. of Auditors, 
Impact Assessments In the EU Institutions: Do They Support Decision-
Making? 24 (Special Report No. 3 2010) available at http://eca.europa.eu/porta
l/pls/portal/docs/1/5412743.PDF (“Public scrutiny of legislative proposals is of 
the utmost importance in relation to the policy objective of better regulation. 
The Commission's final IA reports are public documents available online to all 
interested parties once the related policy initiative has been proposed. This is 
international good practice.”). 
 71. Cf. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, FAST-TRACK 
LEGISLATION: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND SAFEGUARDS, REPORT 
2008-09, H.L. 116–
I, ¶ 163 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld20080
9/ldselect/ldconst/116/116.pdf (“We . . . urge the Government to put 
mechanisms in place to ensure that relevant parliamentary committees and 
stakeholders are consulted about and given the opportunity to respond to 
proposed fast-track legislation ahead of Second Reading in the House in which 
the bill is introduced. This should be possible in all but the most extreme 
circumstances.”). 
 72. See, e.g., HM TREASURY, REVISION OF THE E-MONEY DIRECTIVE AND 
EU REGULATION ON CROSS-BORDER PAYMENTS: A CONSULTATION, 3 (Jan. 20, 
2009) available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407010852/
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/consult_emd_200109.pdf (“This document 
consults on both proposals, with a view to informing the Government approach 
towards EU level negotiations on revision of the EMD, and the 
implementation of a revised Regulation 2560 into UK law.”). 
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than legal commitments. Governmental authorities may ask 
potential commenters how they should go about meeting their 
obligations to implement the supranational rules.73 And they 
may even consult on implementation in circumstances where 
they have limited discretion. For many reasons consultation at 
the time of implementation of transnational standards may 
have a limited impact on the implementing measures. 
Consultations about implementation may come to resemble 
domestic regulatory consultations which, reflecting the limited 
rule-making powers of the regulatory agency, concentrate on 
relatively narrow, more technical questions.  
III. CONSULTATION IN REGIONAL AND GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE  
When governments work together in different fora to 
generate agreements about standards and rules that should 
operate transnationally, they do so using processes which are 
not uniform, which often seem to develop in an ad hoc manner, 
and which do not necessarily reflect any particular conception 
of good government. A growing literature on global 
administrative law seeks to address deficiencies in rule-making 
and standard-setting at the supranational level.74 This 
literature tends to take as a given that supranational standard-
setting is analogous to regulation rather than legislation at the 
domestic level.75 However, although supranational standard-
 
 73. See, e.g., HM TREASURY, PUBLIC CONSULTATION: DRAFT TERRORIST 
ASSET-FREEZING BILL, 2010, Cm. 7852 4, available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/consult_terrorist_assetfreezing_bill.pdf (“The Government is 
committed to ensuring that there is full and effective scrutiny of its draft asset 
freezing legislation. As such, it is launching this public consultation exercise to 
seek the views of interested parties and the general public on our proposed 
approach to terrorist asset freezing. In particular, the Government is 
interested in responses to the following questions:• does the draft Bill set out 
the most effective way of meeting our UN obligations and protecting national 
security whilst also ensuring sufficient safeguards in respect of human 
rights?”). 
 74. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The 
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 
(2005) (defining “global administrative law as comprising the mechanisms, 
principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or 
otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in 
particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, 
participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective 
review of the rules and decisions they make.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Harlow, supra note 22, at 196 (“The principles of agency 
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setting may seem to take on the form of administrative 
processes, it also operates at a more fundamental policy-setting 
level.76 Even where supranational standard-setters develop 
highly technical standards, those standards may embed policy 
assumptions, and they may have significant impacts on the 
lives of citizen-voters around the world.  
The generation of supranational standards may be 
intended to prevent national governments from making policy 
choices which diverge from the standards, and may in fact 
preclude such divergent choices.77 For example, the 1988 Basel 
Capital Adequacy Accord required states to impose capital 
adequacy requirements on international banks, even if those 
states addressed risks to financial stability in other ways. The 
Accord was agreed after the US and the UK announced they 
would apply stringent capital adequacy requirements to foreign 
banks doing business in their jurisdictions.78  
Thus transnational standard-setting is arguably analogous 
to domestic political consultations, involving choices between 
goals, rather than to technical domestic regulatory 
consultations where the objective is to identify the best way of 
regulating to achieve a goal mandated by a statute. However, 
the transnational standard-setters are networks of bureaucrats 
rather than political bodies. And, although supranational 
 
and delegation are used to legitimate regulatory standard-setting in global 
space.”). 
 76. For example, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision develops 
technical standards for capital adequacy but has also set out what it regards 
as the core necessary elements of banking regulation. See BIS, Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.pdf and 
BIS, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel II: International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised 
Framework—Comprehensive Version (June 2006), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf. 
 77. Cf. Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, A Postfunctionalist Theory of 
European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus, 
39 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2009) (“Governance is a means to achieve collective 
benefits by co-ordinating human activity. Given the variety of public goods and 
their varying externalities, efficient governance will be multi-level. But 
governance is also an expression of community. Citizens care—passionately—
about who exercises authority over them. The challenge for a theory of multi-
level governance is that the functional need for human co-operation rarely 
coincides with the territorial scope of community.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International 
Financial Regulation, 49 HARV. INT’L L. J. 447, 500–03 (2008).  
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standards and rules may reduce the discretion of national 
governments, and thus would seem to imply a more general, 
principle-focused consultation, transnational consultations tend 
to resemble domestic regulatory, rather than pre-legislative, 
consultations. In this context the EU, with parliamentary 
representation of citizens as an aspect of the policy 
development process, is more like a domestic government than 
more technocratic bodies such as the Basel Committee and 
IOSCO. The EU’s policy development process includes the 
publication of Green Papers, White Papers, Communications,79 
and other pre-legislative consultative documents which solicit 
comments on general policy issues.80 Other supranational and 
transnational organizations may respond to the EU’s 
consultations.81  
Transnational standard-setters such as the Basel 
Committee and IOSCO are structured as groupings or 
networks of domestic regulators.82 Thus the standards-
development process they are engaged in is qualitatively 
different from that of a legislative or governmental body. But it 
may also be different from that of a domestic regulatory body 
 
 79. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission Reinforcing Economic 
Policy Coordination, COM (2010) 250 final (May 12, 2010) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/euro/documents/2010-05-12-com%
282010%29250_final.pdf. 
 80. Cf. Mario Monti, A New Strategy for the Single Market: At the Service 
of Europe’s Economy and Society, Report to the President of the European 
Commission, José Manuel Barroso 17 (May 9, 2010) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf (“Before 
launching the single market project with the 1985 White Paper, Jacques 
Delors had prepared the initiative through a "tour des capitales" of the then 10 
Member States, plus Spain and Portugal who were soon to join. Today the 
European Union is not only larger and more diverse, with its 27 Member 
States, but also more complex in its articulation, with a much broader 
involvement of stakeholders and civil society.”).  
 81. See, e.g., IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Europe, Fostering 
Sustainability, 21 n.4 (May 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pu
bs/ft/reo/2010/EUR/eng/ereo0510.pdf (“The consultation documents, including 
the IMF’s staff contributions, are available on DG Markt’s website: 
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/crisis_management/index_en.htm#consult
ation; and ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2009/deposit_guarantee
_schemes_en.htm .”). 
 82. On governance networks, see, for example, Carolyn M. Hendriks, The 
Democratic Soup: Mixed Meanings of Political Representation in Governance 
Networks, 22 GOVERNANCE 689 (2009). Hendriks examines the enactment of 
representation in a governance network around energy reform in the 
Netherlands in terms of dramaturgy and rhetoric. Id. at 693–4.  
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engaged in domestic rule-making. Regulators may not have 
formal rule-making powers as a matter of domestic law,83 but 
their limited domestic responsibilities may not effectively limit 
their ability to participate in transnational standard-setting.84 
More generally, even where domestic regulators have rule-
making powers, these powers are constrained by statute. 
Regulators may not feel themselves to be constrained in the 
same way when they participate in transnational standard-
setting.  
In normal times, and to the extent that transnational 
standard-setting is really a process of identifying best practices 
based on what national regulatory systems prescribe, such that 
regulators with limited domestic functions do no more than 
represent the characteristics of their domestic systems in the 
transnational processes, the idea of constrained domestic 
regulators functioning as the articulators of transnational 
standards seems relatively unproblematic. If, on the other 
hand, constrained domestic regulators see their role in the 
context of transnational standard-setting as being the 
development of standards which differ from those they are 
charged to administer, this is more problematic.85 And in the 
aftermath of the crisis transnational standard-setters are 
clearly doing more than just distilling current best practices 
 
 83. See, e.g., Julia Black & Stéphane Jacobzone, Tools for Regulatory 
Quality and Financial Sector Regulation: A Cross-Country Perspective 9 
(OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, Paper No. 16, 2009), available 
at http://oecd.org (“The greatest variation is with respect to rule making 
powers, where OSFI and ASIC lack powers to make binding rules, yet in 
contrast the FSA, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), for example, have 
extensive rule making powers exercised independently of the executive.”). 
Although Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) does not 
have the power to make regulations it does have the power to issue regulatory 
guidance and regulatory relief. See, e.g., ASIC,ASIC: A Guide to Our 
Regulatory Documents: An ASIC Better Regulation Initiative, (June 2007) 5, 
available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ASIC_G
uide_to_regulatory_docs.pdf/$file/ASIC_Guide_to_regulatory_docs.pdf. 
 84. As of May 12, 2010 Tony D'Aloisio, the Chairman of ASIC, was a 
member of IOSCO’s Presidents’ Committee, Executive Committee and of its 
Technical Committee. 
 85. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to 
Regulatory Competition, 52 EMORY L. J. 1353, 1354 (2003) (suggesting that 
regulators may engage in “regulatory globalization” to make it difficult for 
local opponents to block policy changes the regulator’s favours).  
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into transnational standards: they are developing new rules for 
the transnational financial system.  
The idea that the role of transnational standard-setters 
has evolved from a positive role of describing existing best 
practices to a normative function of identifying what best 
practices should be raises new questions about the role of 
consultation in the transnational context. Supranational 
standard-setters have turned to consultation to enhance their 
perceived legitimacy, to inform their work, and to make those 
affected by their standards more receptive to them.86 Some 
have argued that shifting decision-making to multilateral 
institutions can improve democracy, rather than undermine 
it.87 But transnational consultations as currently structured 
suffer from numerous weaknesses which undermine their value 
as mechanisms of legitimization. 
Transnational consultations lack visibility; they are 
usually carried out in a limited number of languages, or even 
only in English. They state that they are aimed at 
stakeholders, which likely reflects their limited visibility and 
the aim of achieving buy-in by those likely to be most affected 
by the standards. But this stakeholder emphasis also implies 
that there may be others (non-stakeholders) whose views are 
less important. As the financial crisis has shown, it is not only 
those who consider themselves to be stakeholders in financial 
regulation who are affected by its failures.  
If one takes the view that what matters in the context of 
standard-setting is the identification of optimal rules, limited 
consultation of those with relevant expertise might be 
appropriate. However, if one takes the view that there are no 
optimal substantive rules, but perhaps only optimal or good 
enough processes for identifying rules, the structure of 
consultation is critical. Better Regulation agendas88 involve 
 
 86. See, e.g., IOSCO Executive Committee, IOSCO Consultation Policy 
and Procedure (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/p
df/IOSCOPD197.pdf .  
 87. See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo & Andrew Moravcsik, 
Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT’L ORG. 1 (2009). The authors 
state that a “[M]ultilateral institutions can empower diffuse minorities against 
special-interest factions, protect vulnerable individuals and minorities, and 
enhance the epistemic quality of democratic decision making in well-
established democratic states.” Id. at 26.  
 88. See, e.g., Commission Action Plan: Simplifying and Improving the 
Regulatory Environment, COM (2002) 278 (June 5, 2002) available at 
BRADLEY - Final Version 4/22/2011 6:13 PM 
502 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 20:2 
 
aspects of both of these views: the emphasis on evidence-based 
policy-making89 suggests that the objective of identifying the 
right rules is key, whereas focusing on transparency and 
accountability involves a concern for process.90  
The legitimacy of global governance clearly involves a wide 
range of issues apart from those relating to how consultation is 
carried out with respect to proposals for new standards and 
rules. The financing of standard-generating bodies also has 
implications for the perceived legitimacy of their standards.91 
The structure and composition of decision-making bodies raise 
complex and controversial issues. 
Supranational standard-setters are evolving their own 
governance principles and codes of consultation. The EU with 
its complex institutional structures has a closer resemblance to 
a federal government than other supranational standard-
setters, and has focused greater attention on issues of 
 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0278:FIN:
EN:PDF [hereinafter Action Plan]; Commission Report on Better Regulation 
for Growth and Jobs in the European Union, COM (2005) 97 (Mar. 2005) at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0097:FIN:
EN:PDF. More recently, policy makers have been promoting smart regulation. 
See, e.g., Commission Report on Stakeholder Consultation on Smart 
Regulation (Apr. 23, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_
regulation/smart_regulation/docs/smart_regulation_consultation_en.pdf 
[hereinafter Smart Regulation].  
 89. See, e.g., GOOD GOVERNMENT, supra note 35, at 25 (“Processes for 
preparing and scrutinising policy and legislation should be as thorough and 
well-informed as possible, in the interests of good government.”). Impact 
assessment is a component of better regulation. See, e.g., Action Plan, supra 
note 88, at 7. 
 90. See, e.g., Commission Consultation Document: Towards a Reinforced 
Culture of Consultation and Dialogue - Proposal for General Principles and 
Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission, 
COM (2002) 277 (June 5, 2002) available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0277:FIN:EN:PDF. 
The Commission notes that “good consultation serves a double purpose by 
helping to improve the quality of the policy outcome and at the same time 
enhancing the involvement of interested parties and the public at large.” Id. at 
5.  
 91. Cf. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, WORK PLAN FOR THE CONSIDERATION 
OF INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS INTO 
THE FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM FOR U.S. ISSUERS 17 (Oct. 29, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalaccountingstandards/workplan
progress102910.pdf (“In the 2010 Statement, the Commission recognized the 
importance of independent funding to support a standard-setting process free 
of undue influence for the ultimate benefit of investors.”). In 2010 the 
International Accounting Standards Board faced a funding shortfall. 
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governance92 and consultation.93 Consultation is a significant 
element of policy-making in the EU: 
[W}ide consultation of stakeholders and in-depth impact assessments 
prior to legislative proposals . . . help to ensure that proper account is 
taken of the concerns of citizens and of all interested parties. They 
make essential contributions to implementing the Commission’s 
‘better lawmaking’ policy.94  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has recently 
expanded its membership (twice)95 to reflect concerns that a 
body representing only a small fraction of the world’s banking 
regulators and central banks would not have the legitimate 
authority to set standards for banking regulation for the world. 
Similarly, the IMF is reviewing its governance arrangements.96  
IV. STRUCTURING CONSULTATIONS: WEAKNESSES IN 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CONSULTATIONS 
Although transnational standard-setters have increased 
their emphasis on consultation as a mechanism of legitimation, 
consultations carried out by the Basel Committee and IOSCO 
lack some of the critical characteristics of domestic 
consultations. Transnational standard-setters work towards 
 
 92. Commission White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 
final (July 25, 2001). 
 93. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission Towards a Reinforced 
Culture of Consultation and Dialogue—General Principles and Minimum 
Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission, 10, COM 
(2002) 704 (Dec. 11, 2002).  
 94. Commission Green Paper: European Transparency Initiative, 2, COM 
(2006) 194 (May 3, 2006).  
 95. See Press Release, BIS, The Basel Committee Broadens its 
Membership (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p090610.ht
m (announcing invitation to join the Committee to Argentina, Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, Hong Kong and Singapore); Press 
Release, BIS, Expansion of Membership Announced by the Basel Committee 
(Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p090313.htm 
(announcing invitation to join the Committee to Australia, Brazil, China, 
India, Korea, Mexico and Russia). 
 96. See Comm. on IMF Governance Reform, Final Report, 6 (Mar. 24, 
2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2009/govref/032409.pdf 
(“[U]ntil the Fund is viewed as legitimate and appropriate for the discussion 
and resolution of global macroeconomic issues, it will remain peripheral and 
unable to achieve the overall stability mandate envisaged by its founders and 
shareholders.”). See also, e.g., IMF Invites Civil Society Input Into Governance 
Reform, INT’L MONETARY FUND (June 26, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/p
ubs/ft/survey/so/2009/NEW062509A.htm. 
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agreement on standards within their own networks, rather 
than on ensuring a broader acceptance of their work. In 
practice, public participation in consultations by transnational 
financial standard-setters is limited.97 And, whereas public 
participation by citizens of developed countries is limited, 
citizens of less developed countries are even less likely to 
participate.98  
There are a number of reasons for the low levels of public 
participation. For example, many domestic consultations on 
financial regulation, transnational consultations on standards 
are framed in a way that makes the views of non-experts seem 
irrelevant. In addition, and perhaps in contrast to domestic 
consultations, they are not designed to be visible and/or 
accessible. The Basel Committee’s work is not reliably front 
page news. A recent article in the New York Times business 
section described Nout Wellink as “chairman of a prominent 
panel that is rewriting global banking regulations.”99 And the 
Basel Committee does not go out of its way to make it easy for 
commenters to make their views known. For example, although 
the press release announcing the publication of the Basel 
Committee/IADI’s “Consultative Document” on Core Principles 
for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems did indicate where 
comments could be sent,100 the consultative document itself did 
not contain requests for comments, or even any indication as to 
where comments could be sent.101 This does not seem to be an 
 
 97. See, e.g., Barr & Miller, supra note 26, at 26 (“The role of the broader 
public was relatively muted, which reflected in part the technical nature of the 
Basel Committee’s work and the fact that for most public-interested 
organizations, the connection between banking standards and broader social 
concerns was not pronounced.”) 
 98. Cf. Chimni, supra note 27, at 800–01 (“[A]t the international level a 
participatory structure has meaning only if third world states and relevant 
NGOs are provided with the financial and technical assistance necessary to 
effectively participate in the work of an international body.”). 
 99. Jack Ewing, A Banker Unafraid to Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, 
at B4. 
 100. Press Release, BIS, Basel Committee and IADI Issue Core Principles 
for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems for Public Consultation (Mar. 12, 
2009), http://www.bis.org/press/p090312a.htm.  
 101. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision & Int’l Ass’n of Deposit 
Insurers, Consultative Document: Core Principles for Effective Deposit 
Insurance Systems (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs151.pdf. Contra, e.g., IOSCO Technical Comm., 
Regulatory Implementation of the Statement of Principles Regarding the 
Activities of Credit Rating Agencies, 2–3 (May 2010), available at 
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enthusiastic general invitation to comment. The Basel 
Committee also has not typically recognized comments in its 
final articulations of standards. However, in the wake of the 
financial crisis the Basel Committee has published comment 
letters on its website.102 Transnational standard-setters have 
not adopted standard practices with respect to publicizing the 
results of their consultations, and incorporating the results of 
consultations into announcements of final standards. 
It should be noted that the lack of standard practices for 
publication of comments and reflection of comments in final 
standards at the supranational level has an effect. It 
demonstrates a lack of uniform practice which is visible in 
domestic regulatory systems. Agencies in the US are working 
towards transparency,103 but there is still some visible 
variation. Whereas the SEC has published comments on 
proposed rule-makings on its website for some time, the 
Federal Reserve Board only publishes comments on some of its 
regulatory proposals on its website.104 Citizens have the right 
to access comments that are part of the rule-making docket, but 
it can take effort to achieve access. In their final rules, agencies 
do not necessarily disclose even the identity of commenters.105 
The UK’s Financial Services Authority summarizes responses 
to consultations in its policy documents.106  
 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD319.pdf (identifying three 
possible means of communicating views on the document). 
 102. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Comments Received on the 
Consultative Documents "Countercyclical Capital Buffer Proposal," BANK FOR 
INT’L SETTLEMENTS (last visited Feb.20, 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs17
2/cacomments.htm. 
 103. See, e.g., the regulations.gov website at 
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#home. 
 104. See FED. RESERVE BD., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2011) (allowing for comments to be made to certain proposals only). 
 105. See, e.g., Electronic Fund Transfers, 75 Fed. Reg. 66644, 66645 (Oct. 
29, 2010) (“The Board received two comments on the interim final rule from a 
credit union trade association and a bankers’ trade association. Both 
commenters generally supported the interim final rule. The bankers’ trade 
association suggested that the Board exercise its exception authority to 
eliminate in-store disclosures where cards sold meet the final gift card rule’s 
substantive fee and expiration date protections. This commenter also 
requested an extension of the delayed effective date. No other comments were 
received. The final rule adopts the interim final rule as issued, with minor 
non-substantive edits.”).  
 106. See, e.g., FSA, Effective Corporate Governance: Significant Influence 
Controlled Functions and the Walker Review, 9–35, PS10/15 (Sept. 24, 2010), 
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The transnational standard-setters could take advantage 
of some of the work of the EU Commission, which regularly 
reviews its consultation practices with a view to improving 
them.107 The EU Commission has recently attempted to make 
some consultations more visible by publishing citizen 
summaries of consultations (although it is not clear that this 
has been very effective),108 and has even dedicated financial 
resources to the development of effective stakeholder groups.109 
The EU’s internal focus on developing effective consultations 
with stakeholders may effectively pressurize transnational 
standard-setters to reform their own consultation practices. For 
example, the Commission has noted that because transnational 
consultation processes (like domestic consultations) may not 
effectively reflect the views of all stakeholders, governments 
may decide that it is their function to represent the public 
interest.110  
 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps10_15.pdf (summarizing 
feedback and responses). 
 107. See, e.g., Smart Regulation, supra note 88, at 3 (“What concrete 
improvements could the Commission make to ensure that all relevant 
stakeholders are aware of and able to participate in consultations? Are there 
particular forms of consultation which you found useful when taking part in 
the Commission consultations (open internet questionnaires, stakeholder 
meetings, public hearings)?”). 
 108. See, e.g., European Union Comm’n, Communication on an EU 
Framework for Cross-border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, COM 
(2009) 561 final (Oct. 20, 2009), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0561:FIN:EN:PDF 
[hereinafter Crisis Management Consultation]; see also European Union 
Comm’n, Citizens’ Summary, Commission Communication on an EU 
Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector (Oct. 
2009), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/crisis-management/0910
20_citicens_summary_en.pdf. The full consultation document raised some 
quite technical policy issues and is seventeen pages long. The summary is two 
pages long, and seems to be designed to persuade citizens that the EU is 
taking action rather than about trying to solicit meaningful comments from 
the public. 
 109. This strategy is not uncontroversial. See, e.g., Andrew Rettman, EU-
funded Think Tanks Defend Their Credibility, EU OBSERVER (Jan. 29, 2010), 
http://euobserver.com/9/29368. 
 110. European Union Comm’n, Internet Governance: The Next Steps, at 4, 
COM (2009) 277 final (Jun. 18, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/informat
ion_society/policy/internet_gov/docs/communication/comm2009_277_fin_en.pdf 
(“Private-sector leadership in the construction and day-to-day management of 
the Internet that we know today has worked well. As noted before, this 
private-sector initiative must be maintained. But non-governmental 
stakeholders must recognise that Internet users worldwide—most of whom do 
not participate and are not otherwise represented in Internet governance 
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One major way in which transnational consultations differ 
from domestic consultations is that the transnational standard-
setters do not necessarily seek to communicate with 
stakeholders in the stakeholders’ own languages. Whereas 
governments of multi-lingual populations communicate with 
their citizens and residents in their own languages (although 
probably more frequently with respect to the provision of 
services111 than with respect to consultation), transnational 
consultations on proposed standards are usually conducted in a 
limited number of languages,112 if not solely in English. 
Although the EU makes efforts to communicate with EU 
citizens in their own languages, such efforts are costly, and 
even EU institutions publish consultation documents in a 
limited number of languages.113 Commentators on the IMF’s 
transparency policy urged that the IMF should translate more 
of its documents into languages other than English.114 ISDA 
may be able to communicate its views in Romanian,115 but 
 
fora—have a legitimate expectation that their governments will guarantee 
that any current or future governance arrangements will reflect the public 
interest of society as a whole and will not be subject to capture by narrow 
commercial or regional interests. Private-sector leadership and effective 
public policies are not mutually exclusive.”). 
 111. And even in the context of service delivery agencies may not provide 
adequate language assistance services. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-10-91, SELECTED AGENCIES CAN IMPROVE SERVICES TO LIMITED 
ENGLISH PROFICIENT PERSONS 12 (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1091.pdf (“Because SBA provides both 
business development services as well as disaster-recovery assistance that 
require different language access services, SBA should use DOJ’s guidance to 
help it complete its LEP plan and recipient guidance consistent with SBA’s 
specific requirements.”). 
 112. The BIS publishes some documents in languages other than English. 
See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS—Other Publications, 
http://www.bis.org/publ/other.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (listing a 
number of documents in languages other than English). 
 113. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), for example, 
consults in English. See EUROPEAN SEC. AND MARKETS AUTH., Consultations, 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/index.php?page=consultation&mac=0&id= (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2011) (listing the details of consultations as well as responses 
in English). 
 114. IMF, Consultation Roundtable on IMF Transparency: Summary of 
Comments from Civil Society Organizations (Feb. 11, 2010), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/trans/2009/052809.htm (“There should be 
more translation of documents into languages other than English.”). 
 115. See ISDA, Susţinerea reformei legislative în România privind 
compensarea bilaterală (netting) şi garanţiile financiare (Oct. 29, 2010), 
http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/RO_ISDA_Ltr_NBR_Oct10.pdf (Rom.). 
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Romanians may not all be capable of communicating their 
views on financial regulation in English. 
Consultations are targeted at particular groups in a 
number of different ways. Consultation documents may be sent 
to particular people, signaling that their responses will be 
valued, and roundtables and meetings may be set up to 
encourage particular people and firms to give their feedback. In 
a less intrusive way, drafters of consultation documents 
sometimes identify specific categories of potential respondents 
as stakeholders,116 or they may construct different consultation 
documents or response forms for different groups. These 
documents may ask different questions of different groups. For 
example, when the IMF sought views about its transparency 
policy it required commentators to categorize themselves as 
civil society organizations, financial markets participants or 
“think tanks, academics and other stakeholders.” The 
questionnaires were different for the different groups. For 
example, whereas civil society organizations and think tanks 
were asked their views about whether IMF transparency 
should be improved by making reports easier to understand, 
more timely, more frank, or easier to access, financial markets 
participants were not asked this question.117  
The identification of specific stakeholders in consultation 
documents may imply that there may be others (non-
stakeholders) whose views are less important. As such, a 
consultation document which refers to stakeholders as those 
who are subject to a regulatory regime, rather than those whom 
it should benefit, seems to imply that the views of the 
beneficiaries of the regime are unimportant.118 
 
 116. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS, CIVIL 
SANCTIONS PILOT: A CONSULTATION ON THE PILOT OPERATION OF CIVIL 
SANCTION POWERS FOR CONSUMER LAW ENFORCERS, URN 10/706, at 2, 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/corporate/docs/c/10-706-civil-sanctions-
pilot.pdf (U.K.) (“This consultation is relevant to: consumer representative 
bodies; businesses; business representative bodies; consumer law enforcers.”). 
 117. See IMF, IMF Seeks Views on its Transparency Policy (Feb. 11, 2010), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/trans/2009/index.htm (providing opinion 
questionnaires for civil society organizations, financial market participants, 
and think tanks only). 
 118. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE ET AL., Debt Management Schemes—
Delivering Effective and Balanced Solutions for Debtors and Creditors, 
CP09/09, at 10, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/debt-
management-schemes.pdf (“In developing these proposals, we have listened to 
the views of a wide range of stakeholders from the credit and advice sectors, 
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Although much of financial regulation is complex and 
technical there are aspects of financial regulation which involve 
combinations of issues which are technical and of little interest 
to consumers, and issues which are directly relevant to 
consumers.119 Whether transnational standard-setters 
emphasize the technical aspects or the consumer aspects may 
have a significant impact on consumers’ interests. 
Transnational consultations which are framed as technical 
exercises through a combination of the specific questions which 
are asked and the identification of particular groups of relevant 
stakeholders tend to undermine the legitimacy of the 
consultation as an element in the production of standards, 
especially those standards which eliminate discretion in 
implementation. Consumers and the organizations which 
represent their interests are more likely than financial firms to 
be excluded from effective participation in supranational 
standard-setting due to the combined effects of opaque 
processes, framing, and lack of resources. 
The approaches of transnational standard-setters to 
publicizing the results of consultations vary. Although some 
Basel Committee publications do not give much information at 
all about responses to consultations,120 the BIS has begun to 
publish comment letters on its website.121 IOSCO generally 
prefers to characterize the comments it receives,122 although it 
 
current operators from both the not-for-profit and commercial sectors and 
other Government Departments. This consultation provides the opportunity to 
comment further.”). 
 119. Some issues are of high salience for consumers. See, for example, 
Federal Reserve, Notice of Study and Request for Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 
29308, May 21, 2004, and the comments submitted in response to this request 
for information about debit card fees, which are available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/index.cfm?doc_id=OP%2D1196
&doc_ver=1&ShowAll=Yes. 
 120. See, e.g., Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision & Int’l Ass’n of Deposit 
Insurers, Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (June 2009), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs156.pdf.  
 121. See, e.g., Basal Comm. on Banking Supervision, Comments Received 
on the Consultative Documents "Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking 
Sector" and "International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, 
Standards and Monitoring," BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (last visited 
Feb.20, 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165/cacomments.htm. 
 122. See, e.g., IOSCO Technical Comm., Regulatory Implementation of the 
Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies, 8 
(June 2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD29
2.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO Hedge Funds Report] (“Having considered the public 
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does sometimes refer to commenters by name.123 Respondents 
may (and often do) publish their responses on their own web 
sites.124 In domestic regulatory systems courts may review the 
record on which regulators act, but this type of review does not 
exist in the context of transnational standard-setting. This lack 
of a mechanism for judicial review of transnational standard-
setting (especially the setting of standards which allow for 
limited discretion in implementation) suggests that the 
procedures for setting standards should be even more 
transparent and open than domestic law-making procedures 
which are subject to review. Transnational consultation 
systems where standard-setters voluntarily set their own 
principles for consultation and for the reporting of the results of 
consultation with no accountability to voters or through judicial 
review are problematic, particularly when they produce 
standards which limit domestic rule-makers’ discretion.  
V. CONCLUSIONS: IMPROVING CONSULTATION 
Fixing transnational consultation is not easy, and it will be 
costly, but it is important to ensure that consultation of citizens 
 
comments received on the Consultation Report, the IOSCO Technical 
Committee has developed the six high level principles below which should be 
applied to the regulation of hedge funds.”). In addition the IOSCO Hedge 
Funds Report has an annex reporting on the results of the consultation, and 
conclusions in light of responses. Id. at 17–23. In some cases the IOSCO Hedge 
Funds Report refers to the responses of specific entities with attribution. Id. at 
19 (“Considering the international dimension of the hedge funds activities, all 
respondents supported the need for more convergence on the regulation of 
hedge fund managers in order to minimise the risk of regulatory arbitrage and 
ensure better level playing field. See, e.g., International Council of Securities 
Associations’ Public Response to the IOSCO Consultation Report on Hedge 
Funds Oversight.”). But comments are not always attributed to particular 
respondents. Id. at 20 (“One respondent challenged that the wider publication 
of details on business plan and fees charged could create commercial problems 
for the managers.”). 
 123. See, e.g., IOSCO Hedge Funds Report, supra note 122, at 19 
(“Considering the international dimension of the hedge funds activities, all 
respondents supported the need for more convergence on the regulation of 
hedge fund managers in order to minimise the risk of regulatory arbitrage and 
ensure better level playing field. See, e.g., International Council of Securities 
Associations’ Public Response to the IOSCO Consultation Report on Hedge 
Funds Oversight.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Letter from Jonathan Taylor & Duncan Fairweather, 
Chairmen at the ICSA, to Greg Tanzer, Secretary General of IOSCO (Apr. 30, 
2009), available at http://www.icsa.bz/pdf/ICSA-Letter-IOSCOreHedgeFunds-
Apr09.pdf. 
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about the rules which affect their lives is not a mere formality. 
One of the most difficult issues relates to language diversity. 
English-only or limited language consultations exclude those 
who do not know the languages of consultation. But, as the EU 
has found, translation involving large numbers of languages 
can be very expensive. Apart from the translation issue, some 
techniques which can increase publicity for proposals about 
regulation at the domestic level may work differently at the 
transnational level. Open meetings125 benefit those with the 
resources to travel, and international travel is often more 
expensive than domestic travel. Standard-setters and 
international organizations can decide to commit financial 
resources to facilitate participation in consultation by groups 
representing those without adequate means. For example, the 
EU finances NGOs, and there is a codex alimentarius trust 
fund to enable developing country participation.126  
Taking steps to help consumers and consumer groups to 
participate in consultations as stakeholders may not in fact 
enhance the legitimacy of the process if consumers’ views are 
only sought with respect to issues identified in advance as 
consumer issues or where the standard-setter assumes that 
consumer stakeholders will be relatively uninformed so that 
their views can be discounted. And whereas limiting the ways 
in which stakeholders can respond to consultations makes it 
easier and cheaper for standard-setters to process responses,127 
 
 125. See, e.g., Crisis Management Consultation, supra note 108, at 17 (“The 
Commission plans to organise a public hearing in early 2010 in order to 
present the results of the consultation and to set out how it intends to proceed. 
This will feed into the preparation of a roadmap of follow up initiatives in the 
areas of early intervention, resolution and insolvency in order to build a crisis 
management framework that would ensure that, in future, all competent 
authorities effectively coordinate their actions and have the appropriate tools 
for intervening quickly to manage the failure of a bank.”). 
 126. Cf. Chimni, supra note 27, at 815 (“While the Trust Fund is certainly 
a step in the right direction, it remains to be seen whether it will have enough 
resources to meet its objectives. India, for example, has expressed concern that 
the broad goals of the Trust Fund, which include the transformation of 
domestic practices rather than simply promoting greater participation of 
developing countries, may, given the Fund’s meager resources, mean that the 
objective of promoting greater participation may suffer.”). 
 127. See, e.g., European Union Comm’n, Consultation Document: Review of 
Directive 2002/87/EC on the Supplementary Supervision of Credit 
Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment Firms in a Financial 
Conglomerate, 1, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-conglomerates/
docs/20091106_questionnaire_fcd_revier.pdf (“The Commission services would 
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it is not the most effective way of legitimating the resulting 
standards. So effective consultation of citizens may require 
rethinking the drafting of consultation documents and avoiding 
structured response forms. Again, the desirable changes 
involve costs. 
 
 
like to ask you to respond to the specific questions that were designed to 
supplement the responses you may have given to the JCFC's consultation of 
its draft Advice . . . In order for your contributions to be timely and properly 
evaluated, when submitting your replies, please maintain the structure of the 
questionnaire provided in this document.”). 
